The Canada-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which comes into force October 1, signals a deepening of the bilateral economic relationship. While it somewhat less ambitious than recent BITs that Canada has concluded with other trading partners, it nevertheless establishes important rights for Chinese and Canadian investors, and the tools to enforce those rights.
The significance of BITs for investors is better reflected in the Canadian term for them: foreign investment protection agreements, or FIPAs. In the absence of a BIT, the only legal recourse for a foreign investor aggrieved by the conduct of a host country is to the domestic courts of the host country, to the extent that the conduct may contravene local law, or to have the government of its home country pursue the matter through diplomatic channels.
By contrast, a BIT imposes substantive obligations on the host country in its treatment of foreign investors of the other party with respect to concerns like discrimination, arbitrary treatment and expropriation. In the event those obligations are breached, most BITs, including the Canada-China FIPA, provide foreign investors with direct and enforceable rights to bring claims for damages before independent and impartial international arbitral tribunals.
BITs are therefore powerful tools for foreign investors who have been wrongfully treated by the host country and a deterrent against such wrongful conduct. The ability of investors under a BIT to bypass local courts and to obtain damage awards that to a large degree will be recognized and enforced around the world is a huge boon for investors operating abroad in difficult and unpredictable jurisdictions.
The advantages that BITs offer over traditional investor remedies explains their exponential growth in recent decades, as countries have concluded them both to protect their outbound investment and to attract inward investment. Canada now has similar treaties with more than two dozen other countries while China has more than 70 such treaties in force.
China's BITs have evolved significantly as China has become more open to inward investment and also a major exporter of capital. The Canada-China FIPA reflects this trend; relative to what China has provided under its other BITs to date, the Canada-China FIPA is cutting-edge, offering Canadian investors protections that are equal to or better than those available to other foreign investors in China.
However, in keeping with Chinese practice, and in contrast with other Canadian FIPAs, the protections in the Canada-China FIPA against discrimination are rather circumscribed. Most notably, a typical Canadian FIPA extends national treatment (the obligation on the host State to treat the other Party's investors and their investments no less favourably than it treats its own investors and investments) to investors seeking to make an investment. This is known as the pre-establishment model. The Canada-China FIPA does not offer this pre-establishment protection.
Also, the FIPA does not restrict Canada's freedom to review and decide whether to approve acquisitions of Canadian businesses under the Investment Canada Act, or China's freedom to do likewise under its laws. In keeping with Canadian practice, those decisions are not subject to challenge under the arbitration procedures in the FIPA, either by investors or either Party.
That is, it does not give Canadian investors the same rights as Chinese investors to make investments in China, nor does it give Chinese investors the same rights as Canadian investors to make investments in Canada. In that sense, the FIPA does not aim to further open the Chinese market to investments from Canada, or vice versa. Importantly though, China may grant pre-establishment protections that are absent in the Canada-China FIPA in BITs it is now negotiating with the European Union and the United States. If so, those protections will accrue to Canadian investors too, by virtue of the most-favoured nation (MFN) obligation in the FIPA, which requires each Party to treat foreign investors and their investments no less favourably than investors and investments of third countries.
The Canada-China FIPA does offer national treatment protection for investments once they have been made, with respect to their "expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition". However, here too the Canada-China FIPA comports with Chinese practice while departing from that of Canada in carving out from its non-discrimination obligations all existing non-conforming measures rather than just those at the sub-national level and those individually identified at the federal level.
Effectively, this means that commitments on national treatment and MFN, and with respect to the nationality of senior management and the admission of managers and key personnel needed to operate an investment, will apply (a) to new measures; and (b) to existing measures only to the extent that they are either (i) made more restrictive or (ii) liberalized, in which case they will be subject to a "ratchet" that locks in the liberalization and prohibits the Party from subsequently reverting to more restrictive measures.
The Canada-China FIPA offers other important protections too to each Party's investors and investments. These include obligations to provide fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security and regulatory transparency; to permit the prompt repatriation of earnings and capital; and not to expropriate investments except in accordance with conditions that include payment of fair market value compensation.
Accordingly, the Canada-China FIPA will help to ensure a more stable and predictable investment environment for investors from each country. Despite the FIPA's limitations in opening the Chinese market to new investment, the protections the FIPA offers are especially likely to engender confidence for outbound Canadian investment in China.
《中加双边投资协定》（BIT）于 10 月 1 日生效，标志着中加双边经济关系进一步深化。与加拿大最近和其他贸易伙伴签署的 BIT 相比，该协定所设立的目标并不高，但这确立了中国和加拿大投资者的重要权利，以及强制执行这些权利的工具。
加拿大称该协定为《外国投资保护协定》（或 FIPA），这一说法更好地反映了 BIT 对投资者的重要意义。在缺少 BIT 情况下，对东道国可能违反当地法律的行为感到不满的外国投资者，只能向东道国的国内法院寻求法律援助，或请求本国政府通过外交途径追查相关事件。
相比之下，BIT 规定了东道国对待另一国外国投资者时在歧视、任意对待和征用等方面的实质性义务。倘若缔约国违反这些义务，包括中加 FIPA 在内的大部分 BIT 为外国投资者提供了直接和可强制执行的权利，以便在独立和公正的国际仲裁法庭提出损害赔偿要求。
因此，BIT 为受到东道国不公正对待的外国投资者提供了强有力的武器，并能够遏制此类不法行为。在很大程度上，BIT 下的投资者绕过当地法院及获得损害赔偿的权利能得到全球范围内的认可和执行，这对在困难重重和不可预测的司法管辖区从事海外经营的投资者是一大利好。
BIT 相比于传统的投资者补救措施拥有诸多优点，因此在近几十年来成倍增长。各国签署 BIT 既是要保护对外投资，也是为了吸引外来投资。加拿大目前已与二十多个国家签署了类似协定，而中国已签署了 70 多个类似协定。
随着中国对外来投资愈发开放，中国的 BIT 经历了显著变化，中国也成为了主要的资本输出国。加中 FIPA 反映了这一趋势；相对于中国目前在其他 BIT 中提供的待遇，加中 FIPA 更进一步，加拿大投资者可享受与其他外国在华投资者同等或更好的保护待遇。
但是，为符合中国惯例，与其他加拿大 FIPA 相比，加中 FIPA 中的反歧视保护相当有限。 最值得注意的是，加拿大 FIPA 通常为希望进行投资的投资者提供国民待遇（即东道国给予另一国投资者及其投资的待遇不低于给予本国投资者和投资的待遇）。这就是所谓的“准入前”模式。 加中 FIPA 并不提供准入前保护。
此外，FIPA 并未限制加拿大根据《加拿大投资法》审查并决定是否批准收购加拿大企业的自由，以及中国根据本国法律采取同样做法的自由。为符合加拿大的惯例，投资者或任何一国不得根据 FIPA 的仲裁程序对这些决定提出反对意见。
也就是说，FIPA 未向加拿大投资者提供与中国投资者同样的在华投资的权利，亦未向中国投资者授予与加拿大投资者同样的在加拿大投资的权利。从这种意义上说，FIPA 无意向加拿大投资进一步开放中国市场，反之亦然。不过重要的是，中国可能在其与欧盟和美国进行谈判的 BIT 中提供加中 FIPA 缺少的准入前保护。倘若如此，加拿大投资者也将可以通过 FIPA 中的最惠国（MFN）待遇享受这些保护，最惠国规定要求每一缔约国给予另一国投资者及其投资的待遇不低于给予第三国投资者和投资的待遇。
加中 FIPA 为实际投资的“扩张、管理、运作、经营、销售或其他处理”方面提供国民待遇保障。不过，加中 FIPA 在非歧视义务中剔除了全部现有的不符措施，而不仅仅是次国民层面的措施及联邦一级单独确定的措施，这一点符合中国惯例，但不同于加拿大惯例。
实际上，这意味着，关于高级管理人员的国籍、为运作投资任用所需的管理人员和关键人员方面的国民待遇和 MFN 承诺，将适用于新的措施；以及更加严格或开放的现有措施，在此情况下，现有措施将受到锁定自由化的“棘轮”的限制，并将禁止缔约方在随后重新采用更加严格的措施。
加中 FIPA 还为缔约国的投资者和投资提供其他重要的保护措施。这些义务包括提供公平公正待遇、全面保护和保障及监管透明度；允许将收益和资金快速汇回本国；不得征用投资（除非根据支付公平市场价值补偿等条件征用）。
因此，加中 FIPA 将有助于为两国投资者营造一个更稳定及可预测的投资环境。尽管 FIPA 在打开中国市场进行新的投资方面存在局限，但 FIPA 提供的保护很可能增强加拿大在华投资的信心。